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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Succession precedents, systemic change and a lame duck 
Personnel shuffles, policy changes and even media coverage of particular 
political insiders have fed speculation about the 2008 presidential succession for 
over a year.  It was inevitable that the amount of time spent in calculating the 
relative fortunes of various apparatchiki would detract from coverage of 
presidential initiatives and actions (except, inasmuch as those actions indicated a 
preferred successor).  Putin has entered the lame duck phase of his presidency, 
and it seems unlikely that he will relish that role. 
 
Clearly, the Russian experience with lame duck status will differ sharply from 
Western democracies, as has the Russian experiment with democracy in 
general. From 1996, almost immediately after the first round of voting in the 
presidential election that would give Boris Yel'tsin his second term, Russia 
experienced the beginning of its first fully post-Soviet succession as Yel'tsin 
became incapacitated with heart and other ailments and day-to-day operations in 
the Kremlin and beyond were left to Anatoli Chubais and other members of the 
Yel'tsin "Family."  Viktor Chernomyrdin, then the Prime Minister, launched an 
indiscreetly early election campaign (complete with television ads of a "vigorous" 
Chernomyrdin riding a water jet-ski as Yel'tsin languished in hospital). (1)  
Chernomyrdin soon found himself maneuvered out of the Prime Minister's chair, 
and out of contention as successor as well.  
 
The ensuing years saw a parade of potential heirs: some designated as such 
(e.g., Boris Nemtsov) (2); others, too clever by half, played the insider game 
crisply, and taking Stalin's adage that "cadres decide everything" to heart, 
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stocked key ministries and Kremlin jobs with loyal minions.  Unfortunately for 
their ambitions, these putative successors didn't realize how profound an effect 
structural changes had had on the Russian political landscape and fell victim to 
Yel'tsin's super-presidential rule, and perhaps more pointedly, to the urgent 
concerns of his "Family" for their personal and financial security. 
 
The climate in the late 1990s was significantly different from the current Russian 
political scene.  The question for potential successors still rests however, in 
toeing the fine line between differentiating themselves from Putin and challenging 
his regime. 
 
President Putin repeatedly affirms his intention to follow the constitutional 
prescription and step aside in 2008.  His hints that his choice of successor will be 
a relative unknown may serve to cool the enthusiasm of the current succession 
favorites and temper their "campaign" fervor.  However, media reports and 
analyses continue apace and, in some cases, are moving beyond the ranking of 
successors and onto more detailed discussions of the political system Putin has 
built and its implications for the coming succession. 
 
The degree of state control over Russian media has been a disconcerting aspect 
of Putin's assertion of state authority; the willingness of analysts to cast a critical 
eye on his reign, a phenomenon currently on an upswing, suggests their 
willingness to reflect Putin in the rear view mirror and highlight his status as a 
lame duck—a perspective likely to spread, unless checked by the administration. 
 
In one recent commentary, Putin's regime is compared to "Stalinism" and 
"Bonapartism," two strongly centralized forms of rule.  The key contrast with 
"Putinism" being "the role and specific place which bureaucracy occupies,"  
particularly "in the general structure of relations between political entities and 
actors."  (3)  In this analysis, bureaucracy, while representing different 
compositions and with different aims, served as the "collective Bonaparte" and 
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the "collective Stalin."  The "collective Putin," on the other hand, is based on a 
more "narrow group and not a collective socio-political substratum or 
corporation." (4) 
 
The system that Putin has developed rests in "confidence...not in the president's 
real policies but in the emotional image, in Putin as a person…." (5)  In this 
aspect, Putin has continued the personalization of political power so evident 
during the Yel'tsin era, which failed to build solid institutions as the basis of 
Russia's political democratic development. 
 
According to this analysis, Putin's "personal departure means a withdrawal of the 
principle which ensures the stability of the system and opens a path to a 
worsening of the contradictions present in it." (6) 
In the end, after the rather unflattering comparisons and conclusions, this 
commentary considers the popularity of the idea of a third term for Putin, which 
reflects his personal popularity as well as a lack of confidence in the 
administration and the system, when considered separately from the president.  
The conclusion is less a rationalization for continuing the Putin presidency 
beyond its current constitutional term, than a premature post mortem on a 
political order likely to change significantly in coming years; as such, it may serve 
as a warning to current political elites. 
 
The degree to which "Putinism" truly is a highly personalized regime, as opposed 
to a more entrenched corporate entity in which both powerful individuals and 
institutions have significant stakes, may be exposed as Putin and the Kremlin 
begin to grapple with the lame duck label.  It is at such moments that 
assumptions about regimes, in this case the effective strength and organization 
of the siloviki, are confirmed or refuted. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) "Russia Picks its Safe Pair of Hands," By David Hearst, The Guardian, 30 Oct 
06 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(2) Yel'tsin Backs Youth in Divided Kremlin," By Dmitri Zaks, 25 Apr 97, The 
Moscow Times via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(3) "Manual steering regime," by Sergei Chernyakhovsky, 5 Oct 06, Gazeta.ru; 
OSC Translated Text via World News Connection (WNC). 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Regional Review: Central Federal District  
Georgi Poltavchenko, the Presidential representative to the Central Federal 
District, is the only one of Putin’s presidential envoys actually to have been 
appointed during the Yel’tsin era. Yel’tsin named Poltavchenko his presidential 
envoy to the Leningrad region in July 1999, a month before Putin was named 
Prime Minister. In May 2000, when Putin announced his envoys to the seven 
federal districts, Poltavchenko was reassigned to his current post in a crucial 
region that includes Moscow and comprises one third of Russia’s population. 
 
Like many of the individuals holding positions in Putin’s administration, 
Poltavchenko got his start in the KGB. As part of the Leningrad Oblast KGB 
Directorate, he oversaw the security aspect of the transportation system. (1)  
After eleven years  in the KGB, Poltavchenko began serving in the Leningrad 
Oblast Soviet as a deputy in 1990. In October 1992, Poltavchenko became chief 
of Saint Petersburg’s Federal Tax Police Service Administration. (2)  In that 
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capacity, he participated in the 1998 investigation of the television company 
Russkoye Video. (3)  Evidence from this inquiry provided some of the grounds for 
the action against oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky’s Media Most Group in May 2000, 
which culminated with Gusinsky’s abrupt departure from Russia in December of 
that year.  (4) 
 
Poltavchenko’s appointment as presidential envoy to the Central Federal District 
was seen as a means of counterbalancing the influence of Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov. Luzhkov was seen as fierce rival for Putin both in Moscow and in the 
presidential elections when Putin first came to power. Poltavchenko began 
contesting Luzhkov’s power base immediately. Within the first two months of his 
tenure, Poltavchenko threatened to take legal action against Luzkhov for failure 
to comply with federal laws prohibiting compulsory internal registration. (5)  
Poltavchenko reversed his position and supported Luzhkov’s mandatory 
registration requirements in the capital just three months later. (6)  This turnabout 
was interpreted by some as a sign that Luzhkov had returned to favor with the 
Kremlin. (7)  
 
Although Luzhkov took the lead in the pro-Putin United Russia’s electoral lists in 
the elections for the Moscow City Duma in November 2005, a move that might be 
interpreted as support for Putin, personnel changes orchestrated by the Kremlin 
have removed key elements of Luzkhov’s team over the last year.  For instance, 
in August 2005, Putin selected Luzhkov’s deputy mayor, Valery Shantsev, to 
serve as the leader of the Nizhny Novgorod region. Until that point, Shantsev had 
been viewed as one of the most promising contenders to succeed Luzhkov when 
his term expires in 2007. (8)  Luzhkov has announced that he will step down at 
the end of his term. In November 2005, another member of Luzhkov’s 
administration, Mikhail Men, was appointed by Putin (and with Poltavchenko's 
input) as governor of the Ivanovo region. (9)  Now, with the end of Luzhkov’s 
term rapidly approaching, it is widely anticipated that Poltavchenko, in fact, may 
be the candidate to succeed him as Moscow's mayor. 
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Although relatively media shy on the domestic front, Poltavchenko has managed 
to increase his profile in foreign relations in the last few years and has assumed 
a fairly significant role in Russia’s relationship with the Balkan states. He and 
Luzhkov together have taken the lead in expanding Russia’s economic 
cooperation with Croatia. They have visited Croatia and hosted Croatian officials 
in Moscow, in order to discuss deepening economic ties in the areas of 
biotechnology, pharmacology and tourism. (10)  
 
Poltavchenko has a particularly prominent role in Russia’s ties with Serbia-
Montenegro. The administration has used Poltavchenko to make low-level 
statements about preserving the territorial integrity of Serbia with relation to both 
Montenegro and Kosovo. (11)  In one such statement, Poltavchenko said that 
Russia was prepared to use its influence “to avert unilateral actions” of the 
international community in Kosovo. (12)  While Luzhkov appears to be an integral 
player in the Russian-Croatian relationship, he seems absent from Serbian 
relations. 
 
Poltavchenko drew the attention of some of the international press in October 
2005, when he called for Lenin’s body to be removed from its Red Square 
mausoleum. "I do not think it is entirely correct that those who started these 
troubles should be located by the Kremlin, at the very centre of the state," he 
said. (13) 
 
Given the rampant problem of corruption in Moscow and the regions, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that (the clearly ambitious) Poltavchenko also has jumped 
on the anti-corruption bandwagon. The presidential envoy explained (and 
seemed partly to excuse) its prevalence in the Central Federal District with his 
recent statement that “seventy to eighty percent of budget money circulates in 
the regions of the Central Federal District, especially the Moscow region.” (14) 
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Poltavchenko’s office is located just outside the Kremlin and he remains a 
personal friend of Putin’s. According to one Moscow newspaper, he is famous 
with citizens for his reception offices, which are rarely open. (15)  He may be 
close to the Kremlin, but will that be enough to propel him forward in 2007 and 
beyond? 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) "Putin's Central Federal District Representative Poltavchenko Profiled," 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 Oct 06; OSC Translated Text via WNC. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) “Chubais linked to St. Petersburg corruption probe,” Moscow NTV in Russian 
1900 GMT 27 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-087 via ISCIP Database. 
(4) “Putin moves in mysterious ways,” Kommersant, 19 May 00; WPS via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(5) “Kremlin threatens Moscow mayor with legal action,” Agence France Presse, 
20 Jul 00 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) “Luzhkov’s regime survives,” Kommersant, 19 Oct 00; WPS via Lexis-Nexis.  
(7) Ibid. 
(8) “Experts: Kremlin takes edge off Moscow mayor’s team,” RIA NOVOSTI, 4 
Aug 05 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) “Mikhail Men: Not as much time for sport and music,” Izvestia, 24 Nov 05; 
WPS via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) “Russian officials meet Croatian prime minister to discuss economic 
cooperation,” ITAR-TASS, 24 Nov 04; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC. 
(11) “Serbia’s Kostunic talks to Putin’s envoy about furthering bilateral 
cooperation,” TANJUG, 16 Feb 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC.  
(12) “Putin envoy says Russia sees Serbia and Montenegro as strategic partner,” 
ITAR-TASS, 17 Feb 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC.  
(13) “Waxing stupid in the Kremlin,” Guardian, 21 Oct 2005 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) “A national project called ‘fighting corruption,’” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 Sep 
06; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(15) “Russian paper rates efficiency of Putin’s representatives in federal districts,” 
Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 13 May 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Update: Borders: Russian-Kazakh border to be improved… 
In May 2005, General Vladimir Pronichev, Commander of Russia’s Border 
Guards announced that R15 Billion of the Guards’ new budget would be 
dedicated to improving the country’s border fortifications, especially along the 
Georgian-Russian boundary. The aforementioned amount was to be allocated 
specifically for the procurement of new surveillance technologies and the 
construction of new border posts. (1)  
    
The importance assigned to the Georgian-Russian border is emphasized by the 
number of visits paid to the area by senior Russian officials. Last May, FSB 
Director Nikolai Patrushev accompanied General Vladimir Pronichev to 
Kabardino-Balkaria (close to the Pankisi Gorge—a Georgian area that Russia 
keeps claiming has been used as a base by Chechen terrorists) on a 
“familiarization” trip, designed to demonstrate to the General the service 
conditions of the Guards. (2) Russia’s Georgian border has remained in the news 
as a result of the escalating Georgian-Russian crisis, and, in what might be 
viewed as a “warning” move, Patrushev announced on 1 September that 3 extra 
brigades (2 mountain troops, 1 interior ministry) of non Border Guard troops 
would be positioned near the Georgian border as soon as possible. (3)  (It should 
be noted that the emphasis given to Russia’s border with Georgia by senior state 
officials has an additional purpose, namely to demonstrate to the world—and the 
International Olympic Committee—that Sochi, just north of Georgia's Abkhaz 
border (a city which is bidding for the 2014 Winter Games) is a secure city, and 
that Russia is capable of protecting foreign athletes.)  
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It has become increasingly evident that the border reform program is larger than 
it first appeared.  Between May and June, Patrushev signed into law several 
pieces of legislation reorganizing Russia’s borders wholesale. The new laws 
increased from 5 Km-30 Km the size of border zones. At a stroke Russia has re-
created Soviet style borders, down to large “closed areas” (such as the 
Vladivostok region—near a major Pacific naval base), where entry is only 
possible with prior FSB permission—subsequent, of course, to a detailed 
explanation of purpose of travel, productions of identification documents and 
proof of Russian citizenship. (4)  
    
Then, on 4 October, after a meeting with Pyotr Sumov, Governor of Chelyabinsk, 
General Pronichev announced that Russia would undertake a major project to 
improve immediately the Kazakh section of Russia’s border. In this regard, $160 
Million dollars has been allocated to the Border Services’ 2007 budget for the 
construction of 20 new border installations, including housing and administrative 
centers. (5)  As yet, no indication has been given as to whether the Russian-
Kazakh border will contain any “closed areas.”  
    
Given the proximity of the Baikonaur space facility, and the proximity of many 
former Soviet or Russian nuclear facilities, it seems safe to predict that areas on 
the Kazakh border indeed will be sealed. Several issues need to be raised 
regarding Russia’s border operations: Expanded border zones along frontiers 
Russia is treating as “trouble spots,” such as Georgia's, were to be expected. 
However, is a 30 km zone being created along the border with a member of 
Russian-led organizations, such as Kazakhstan, in order to contain instability 
further south? The regressive border situation demonstrates that Russia has not 
moved far from its Soviet and Czarist imperial past.  
 
German agreement to supplement those with Japan, Ukraine  
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On 6 October, General Vladimir Pronichev met with his German counterpart, 
Rudiger Kass, Head of the German Federal Border Service. The purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss bilateral operations against immigrant trafficking, 
organized crime and terrorism, as well as to arrange exchanges between the two 
services. A cooperation agreement is to be signed between the border services 
in 2007. (6)  Russia has already signed cooperation agreements with the 
Ukrainian (7) and Japanese border services this year. (8) 
 
Spy fever 
Early in August, Russia’s courts sentenced Colonel Sergei Skripal, a former 
intelligence officer, to 13 years in a high security penal camp. Skripal allegedly 
had been working for Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service for nine years, and his 
case is only one of many such espionage investigations. (9)  In the last two 
weeks, Russia’s "spy fever" seems to have reached new levels: On 3 October, 
the FSB announced that it had “thwarted” an attempt by “foreign” based hackers 
to access top-secret research from a Siberian institute. (10)  Apparently the site 
specializes in "chemical" research (probably this means chemical weapons). Igor 
Akhrimeyev, the FSB’s spokesman claimed that the data supposedly sought by 
the hackers was worth $100 million, and that the United States and China had 
“displayed interest” (probably a euphemism for attempted espionage) in the 
institute’s work. (11)  
   
A day after this announcement, FSB Director Patrushev conducted an interview 
with Argumenty i fakty, during which he revealed that yet more individuals, 
named as Zaporozhsky, Starina, Oyamae, Sypachev, and Vyalkov and A. 
Dumenkov “recently” had been convicted of treason. The only specifics given 
were that Dumenkov allegedly had passed laser technology to Germany and had 
been sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. (12)  Patrushev used the 
interview essentially to claim that Russia is being attacked on all sides by foreign 
agencies, citing the fact that the FSB had conducted some 60 espionage 
investigations in the last twelve months. (13)  It still has not been revealed which 
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agencies employed these individuals. Were it the GRU or SVR, the FSB likely 
would be in full attack mode toward its inter-service rivals. Thus, it must be 
assumed that they are FSB officers. 
 
The timing of the announcement concerning hacking, and of Patrushev’s 
interview cannot be discounted, in light of the "purge" of the FSB which took 
place in his absence several weeks ago. (14)  At this point, it seems safe to 
conclude that Patrushev’s competence and leadership of the FSB are in 
question, and that the announced successes were designed first to solidify his 
position, and second to demonstrate to President Putin that he is the "right man" 
to lead the FSB, and finally, to "fight back" against his rivals in the Kremlin 
administration, such as Viktor Cherkesov. (15) 
 
Were the Security Services involved in Anna Politkovskaya murder?  
On Saturday 7 October, as she exited an elevator in her Moscow apartment 
building, Anna Politkovskaya was killed “execution-style,” by gunshot wounds to 
the head and chest.  A pistol and four empty shell casings were found near her 
body. (16)  Throughout her career, Politkovskaya had made a name for herself 
by writing about the Chechen war in highly critical, detailed reports, which were 
at odds with the official Kremlin line. According to her editor at Novaya gazeta, 
Politkovskaya recently had completed an investigation into torture by Russian 
forces and loyalists in Chechnya, and was preparing a report for publication. (17)  
   
The investigation into Politkovskaya’s murder, which apparently has begun 
already, is to be headed directly by Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika. As yet, 
Chaika’s office has refused to comment on the case (save to say that the murder 
was well planned), including on the issue of surveillance tape of the murderer, 
and of an apparent female accomplice caught on camera following Politkovskaya 
as she shopped at Ramstore during her journey home. (18)  Politkovskaya’s life 
had been threatened many times before: notably in 2001, when, as a result of 
her investigation into the disappearance of Zelimkhan Murdalov in Grozny, an 
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OMON soldier named Sergei Lapin threatened to assassinate her, (19) and when 
she was poisoned while en route to negotiate with the hostage takers at Beslan 
in 2004.  
    
The manner of the investigation into her murder is suspicious. First, her 
computer, which contained the torture story and its photos, has been impounded, 
as have her cameras, notebooks, and “other evidence.” Politkovskaya’s phone 
calls also will be played back, a tacit acknowledgement, by prosecutors, that they 
were tapped. (20) 
   
Politkovskaya’s assassination was carried out—not without symbolism—on 
President Putin’s birthday, and shortly before Chechen President Ramzan 
Kadyrov’s 30th birthday. (21)  Given the facts as known: namely the 
acknowledgement that the killing was professional, the seizure and therefore 
likely non-publication of a story damaging to the regimes, both in Moscow and in 
Grozny, it seems safe to conclude her death was "ordered." 
    
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 4 (15 Jun 06)  
(2) Ibid.  
(3) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 2 (5 Oct 06).  
(4) “Russia Is Re-Establishing Soviet Borders,” Kommersant, 2 Aug 06; What the 
Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis and ISCIP Analyst, Vol XIII, Ibid.  
(5) “Russia Splashes Out On Security Infrastructure At Kazakh Border,” 4 Oct 06, 
Interfax-AVN Military News Agency; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) “Chiefs of Russia, Germany Border Services Discuss Fight Against Crime,” 
ITAR-TASS, 6 October; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(7) “RF, Ukraine Chiefs of Border Sign Cooperative Development Plan,” ITAR-
TASS, 11 May 06; Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(8) “Russia, Japan Have Signed The Protocol On Cooperation Between Border 
Guards,” Defense and Security, 10 May 06; Financial Times via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 8 (17 Aug 06). 
(10) “FSB Says It Stopped Foreign Hackers,” The Moscow Times, 4 Oct 06 via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “The FSB Is Investigating,” Argumenty I Fakty, 4 Oct 06; What The Papers 
Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Ibid.  
(14) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 2 (5 Oct 06).  
(15) Ibid. 
(16) “Politkovskaya Gunned Down Near Home,” The Moscow Times, 9 Oct 06 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(17) “The Final Dispatch Of A Reporter Murdered for Telling The Truth,” The 
Independent, 13 Oct 06.  
(18) “Putin Promises Politkovskaya Investigation,” The Moscow Times, 10 Oct 06 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(19) “Murder Theories: Contract From Abroad Or Revenge for Chechnya,” 
Izvestia, 12 Oct 06; What The Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.  
(20) “Russian Police Seize Computer of Murdered Journalist,” Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, 8 Oct 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(21) “The Final Dispatch Of A Reporter Murdered for Telling The Truth,” The 
Independent, 13 Oct 06. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
Why the doctrine denial? 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled in developing its 
military doctrine.  In its true meaning, a doctrine is the representation of a set of 
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concrete beliefs.  In today’s Russia, what is being touted as doctrine would be 
described better as a sort of national security strategy.  Regardless of what 
they’re calling it, there is no doubt the changing global and domestic 
environments demand that a security strategy must flex to keep up with an ever-
changing world.   
             
The first non-Soviet doctrine was signed into effect by Boris Yeltsin in 1993.  It 
was titled “Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine” and was written to lay a new 
military footing for Russia and establish a stance with regard to the use of 
nuclear weapons. (1)  Throughout the mid and late 1990s, discussions about the 
need for a revision of the doctrine were a recurrent theme. In April 2000, on the 
heels of NATO operations in Kosovo, President Putin approved the next edition 
of the military doctrine. (2)   
             
Now, there appears to be some disagreement as to the existence of yet another 
new draft military doctrine.  In numerous media reports released on 20 
September, the draft of a new doctrine, described in convincing detail, “has been 
prepared by an expert group of the Defense Ministry.” (3)  If not for the fact that 
the document reportedly names the United States and NATO as key potential 
enemies, this news likely would not have garnered much attention. (4)  In fact, 
with no new doctrine or strategy issued post-9/11, it could be said that an update 
was overdue. In May of this year, following President Putin’s address to the 
Federal Assembly, discussions in the Security Council, the General Staff, and the 
Defense Ministry commenced regarding the need to revise the military’s doctrine 
again. (5)  Nonetheless, the day after the media unexpectedly reported news of 
this draft, the Russian Defense Ministry refuted the reports: Deputy Prime 
Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said “I know nothing about that.  I 
haven’t received any instructions to prepare a new military doctrine.” (6)   
             
So, why did the Defense Ministry deny that the draft exists? Madina 
Shavlokhova, the Gazeta journalist who broke the story, provided two 
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explanations: Either the Defense Ministry experts who drafted the document 
were working directly for Putin, against the wishes of Ivanov, or government 
leadership is acting to avoid premature publicity about the doctrine. (7)  An 
additional reason comes to mind:  First, the language in the doctrine naming the 
United States and NATO as enemies may have required further review by the 
political leadership before the draft was leaked.  The Kremlin also might have 
preferred to control the timing of the release of the doctrine in the hopes of 
minimizing the response to it.  Then again, with the increasingly harsh stance 
towards Georgia, Russia may not want to commit to any policy that could limit its 
options in dealing with the conflict.  Regardless of the reason, don’t be surprised 
to see an "approved" version of the doctrine released once an acceptable 
rebound period has elapsed.  
 
Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia 
In Russia’s continuing effort to punish Georgia for arresting four GRU members 
last month, anything and everything seems to be fair game…including the issue 
of withdrawing Russian troops from Georgia. So far, Russian leaders have 
debated between halting the process altogether, continuing the withdrawal on 
schedule, and accelerating the troop movements.  While each of these options 
has earned media comment, none have seemed to raise a reaction from 
Georgian leaders.   
             
Following the Rose Revolution, President Saakashvili immediately established 
two primary objectives (he’s still working on both):  First, he vowed to regain 
control in the breakaway regions of Adjaria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  In 
addition, he made it a goal to develop relations with the West and gain eventual 
NATO membership for Georgia. (8)  Because NATO membership wouldn’t be 
considered until Russian troops were out of Georgia, this too became a high 
priority. (9) 
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During initial negotiations, once the withdrawal was agreed upon in principle, 
Moscow insisted it would take eleven years to complete the process of closing 
the Soviet-era military bases at Akhalkalaki and Batumi.  Military analyst Pavel 
Felgenhauer wrote in a Moscow Times commentary that “Russia’s strategy is to 
stall in the hopes that political circumstances more favorable to Russia will arise 
in Georgia in the future.  It’s hoped that in 10 years, a pro-Moscow government 
may be installed in Tbilisi…; or that Georgia will disintegrate and semi-
independent pro-Moscow fiefdoms will be created….” (10)  However, as recently 
as March of this year, and after much gnashing of teeth, officials from both 
countries agreed on a timeline that would have the last Russian base closed and 
troops departed by late 2008.  The timeline established that “the Akhalkalaki 
base is to be emptied of most of its heavy equipment during 2006 and to be 
completely closed by October 1, 2007, with a possible extension until December 
31, 2007, subject to weather conditions.  The Batumi base is to ship out most of 
its heavy equipment during 2007 and to be completely closed before the end of 
2008.” (11)  Additionally, the Tbilisi headquarters of the Russian Group of Forces 
in the Transcaucasus (GRVZ) were to remain open to supervise activities and 
then close in conjunction with the base at Batumi. (12) 
 
Until the arrests last month, progress on the project had been moving along in a 
timely manner.  In fact, Russia noted that all requirements for 2006 had been 
satisfied early. (13)  Now however, Moscow seems to be using the arrest of the 
GRU officers to cloud the withdrawal issue, although they were handed to Russia 
almost immediately.  Senior officials though, appear to be having difficulty 
coordinating their plan.  First, there was the GRVZ commander, Major General 
Andrei Popov, who threatened on 29 September that “Further hostile actions and 
the use of force by the Georgian side…may not only complicate but also slow 
down the withdrawal process.” (14)  Following up on the threat, the process was 
indeed halted for a short time.  Then on 1 October, in the midst of evacuating 
Russian citizens and suspending all transportation and postal services to and 
from Georgia, President Putin ordered the Defense Ministry to resume troop and 
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equipment withdrawal operations according to the plan. (15)  Finally, in a 
television interview on 8 October, Defense Minister Ivanov had yet another 
opinion on the matter.  When anchorman Sergei Brilyov raised a question about 
claims of speeding up the withdrawal effort, Ivanov said “It’s simple: our military, 
at least in Tbilisi, are in the position of hostages and the sooner we rescue them 
from there the more comfortable I will feel.” (16) 
 
Despite forces being placed on higher than normal alert status, all has remained 
peaceful, if tense.  Following a brief interruption, lessons have resumed for some 
of the children at the Russian Defense Ministry’s secondary schools, where 
children of Russian servicemen represent sixty-six percent of the student 
population. (17)  The other thirty-four percent are mostly Georgian children.  Now 
however, in accordance with a decision made by the Defense Ministry, "children 
of Georgian citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to study at any of the 
three...schools…in Tbilisi, Batumi, and Akhalkalaki.” (18)  Taken together with 
the recent endeavor to oust children with Georgian surnames from Moscow area 
schools, this move is reminiscent of racial segregation or Nazi exclusionary 
policies and stains Russia's reputation internationally.  
 
Only time will tell, but right now both President Putin and Saakashvili state 
adamantly that going to war is not in their best interests.  If such an armed 
conflict were to combust, the most likely spark would ignite in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  However, keep an eye on the Russian troop withdrawal process as 
another potential trigger point.  
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces (External) 
By Daniel DeBree 
 
Military exercises 
Ostensibly, military exercises serve the sole purpose of training and evaluating a 
state’s military machine.  Whether assessing the command and control, 
coordinating between different types of arms (or even between the armed forces 
of different nations) or executing a particular type of mission, military exercises 
serve a very useful purpose.  They also have a deeper meaning, however, in that 
military exercises tend to follow their political leaders, and these military muscle 
movements also change the political landscape.  Recent exercises conducted in 
Russia and across the former Soviet Union speak volumes about both military 
and political issues. 
 
Exercises that tend to create the biggest splash are those that either are overtly 
or covertly intended as a show of force, with the motive of changing another 
state’s behavior.  Russia has conducted at least two of this type in order to 
intimidate Georgia.  First, in February, the 58th Army Group exercised near the 
Georgian border in North Ossetia.  Using large scale maneuvers, the 58th 
exercised their ability quickly to mobilize a brigade-size unit in the capital of North 
Ossetia and force march it to the Transcaucasus Highway, which is the main line 
of communication leading to Tbilisi.  Simultaneously, they mobilized small, 
“tactical” groups via air in the mountains near the border with Georgia and South 
Ossetia.  In addition, the Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, who are 
personnel drawn from one of the 58th Army Group’s mechanized brigades, went 
on “high alert” during the exercise.  Although the Russian military leadership 
claimed that the brigade was not part of this exercise, the extremely coincidental 
timing indicates some level of coordination. (1) 
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This summer, as Georgia sent security forces into the Kodori Gorge, Russia 
exercised the 58th Army Group on an even larger scale.  The Russian leadership 
made no bones about the purpose of the exercise, with Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov explaining that it was intended to “help peacekeeping forces defend 
unrecognized republics, if needed.” The 58th again went through its paces, this 
time with several thousand troops, aircraft, helicopters, and armored vehicles on 
four ranges close to the Georgian border. (2) This exercise was significantly 
more complex than its predecessor, including the use and transfer of the Pskov 
Airborne Force and Caspian Flotilla marine units. (3) Called “Caucasus Frontier 
2006,” the exercise’s stated military intent was to fight “extremists, saboteurs, 
and terrorists.” (4) The true purpose, however, undoubtedly was to send an 
unambiguous shot across the Georgian bow. 
 
Russia also conducted some very large scale exercises of a different nature with 
Belarus in June.  Called "Shield of the Union 2006," this exercise simulated a 
large-scale conventional attack on the 20th Army of the Moscow Military District. 
(5) Consisting of several thousand Russian and Belarussian troops, 180 armored 
fighting vehicles and 23 aircraft, it also served as the Russian military’s unveiling 
of the new MI-28N attack helicopter, which participated for the first time.  
Although it served primarily as a ground attack exercise, Shield of the Union also 
assessed the effectiveness of the joint air defense system that the two countries 
have deployed in the region. (6) More than 2,000 Belarussian reserves were 
called up to participate, which tested mobilization plans and implementation. (7) 
 
Again, there was more than a military impetus to an exercise of this size.  In fact, 
Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, who attended part of the exercise, 
expected that it would “evoke a major political response.” (8) But from whom?  
Russian Defense Secretary Ivanov was very careful to point out that the exercise 
was not “aimed against anyone,” although Lukashenko seemed to contradict this 
sentiment less than two days later when he pointedly stated that NATO had 
moved significantly closer to the Western border of both countries. (9) If the 
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rhetoric left any room for doubt, the construct of the exercise should serve to 
erase it—only NATO is a force large and powerful enough to even contemplate a 
conventional attack on the Moscow Military district. 
 
Ukraine also learned about the political implications of military exercises this 
year, but in a much different manner.  The sixth “Sea Breeze” joint military 
exercise between the United States and Ukraine was scheduled for June of this 
year, but did not go off quite as planned.  Conducted in the Crimea, the first five 
of these annual exercises went off as scheduled with very little fanfare.  This 
year, however, the exercise coincided with the electoral victory of the pro-
Russian party, changing the scenario considerably.  The first threads began to 
unravel when a US ship called on the Ukrainian port of Feodosiya prior to the 
start of the exercise.  This sparked anti-NATO protests and civil disobedience 
that mounted as time went on.  Motor coaches carrying 259 US Marines were 
stoned by mobs of protestors, although no one was hurt. (10) Propaganda was 
even more shrill, with some Ukrainian TV stations claiming that this small number 
of Marines had captured the city of Sochi and simultaneously shipped in toxic 
waste to ruin the environment.  The Russian-dominated Crimean parliament took 
a hand in the matter, passing its own resolution to “outlaw” foreign troops on its 
territory. In the end, the protests were successful, and the exercise was 
cancelled. (11) 
 
This unanticipated turn of events caused severe problems for Ukraine.  At a 
minimum, the civil disobedience and anti-NATO tenor of the protest is an 
embarrassment for a country that, until recently, had stated aspirations for 
membership in NATO.  Ukrainian Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko attributed 
all of this to “certain forces” in Russia meddling in Ukrainian affairs. (12) Of 
course, the bitterness involved in efforts to form a coalition government at this 
time of pro-Western and pro-Russian parties clearly spilled over to fuel the 
protests, but the lesson learned in the West may have been just how deep the 
Russia-West divide is among Ukraine's population.  More than 60% of the 
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population opposes joining NATO, making this point the most unpopular initiative 
of President Yushchenko.  Even in western Ukraine, only 38% of the populace 
supports NATO membership. (13)  In the end, although the exercise was never 
carried out, it still served a political purpose, albeit one neither the Ukrainian 
military or political leadership intended—to air Ukraine’s “dirty laundry.” 
 
Building bridges 
Russian soldiers have set foot in Lebanon for the first time since the 18th century 
to assist that country in rebuilding its infrastructure after the 34-day Hezbollah 
war with Israel this summer.  A single battalion of Russian engineers consisting 
of 307 men and 47 officers was dispatched on October 1st to repair a total of six 
bridges that are needed to connect the northern half of Lebanon with the 
devastated South.  They are based in the town of Sadya, which is about 50 
kilometers south of Beirut and about 10 kilometers north of the area controlled by 
UN peacekeeping forces.  Although there is a security contingent equipped with 
small arms, the unit did not take any heavy weapons. (14) The Lebanese 
government agreed to provide security for the sappers as they transit from their 
field encampment to their work sites and at the sites themselves.  Russia, in 
return, has provided all of the equipment and supplies for building this 
infrastructure.  Work has begun already on two bridges, with their completion 
expected by the end of this week.  This entire operation is expected to cost 
Russian $500M rubles and last until the end of November. (15) 
 
From the very beginning of this enterprise, the Russian leadership has been 
careful to point out that this is a bilateral agreement between the countries of 
Lebanon and Russia and that these troops are not peacekeeping forces. When 
questioned, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly stated that Russia would not 
consider sending forces to the UN Peacekeeping Mission, but that he would only 
discuss directly with the Lebanese Government what assistance could be 
rendered. (16) In fact, President Putin also was very careful to request a letter of 
need from the Lebanese before agreeing to the deployment. (17) Lebanon 
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responded by sending back a “note stating that it fully agrees with the Russian 
government's proposals on the duration and conditions of the presence of 
Russian military servicemen in the country,” and this seems to have fit the bill. 
(18) 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
Russia and the benefits of North Korean nukes 
Russia has long had an affair with what much of the West, including the United 
States, considers rogue regimes. From inviting Hamas to the Kremlin to 
engaging in various arms deals with Syria, Iran and others, Russia has put itself 
in the international spotlight. Although the Kremlin hopes to be seen as a 
“pragmatic” diplomatic conduit, its actions suggest otherwise. One need only look 
at the situation regarding North Korea as a current example. 
 
After withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and 
announcing that it had acquired nuclear weapons in Feb. of 2005, North Korea 
boasted on October 9, that it had tested a nuclear weapon: “The field of scientific 
research in the DPRK successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under 
secure conditions on October 9, 2006, at a stirring time when all the people of the 
country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great, prosperous, 
powerful socialist nation,” declared an official statement from the Korean Central 
News Agency. (1) 
 
Upon hearing of Pyongyang’s announcement, many governments quickly began 
to denounce the North Korean decision. At a meeting with the Ministerial 
Cabinet, Vladimir Putin declared that the nuclear test was a “huge blow to the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world.” (2) Putin also 
discussed the matter with U.S. President George Bush. In the conversation, 
which was initiated by the United States, the two presidents agreed for the need 
“to coordinate efforts to resolve the problem.” (3) 
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However, “coordinating efforts” is often easier said than done between the United 
States and Russia, whose state of relations has come under question in both 
American and Russian media. One of the continuing points of contention 
between the two regarding the resolution of nuclear issues has been the 
imposition of sanctions. The case of Iran seems to have set a precedent – 
Russia is against any really painful sanctions. The latest disagreement regarding 
Iran came in early October when Russian denounced a proposal offered by the 
United States that would impose sanctions against states maintaining energy- 
and/or weapons-related ties to Iran. (4) 
 
In dealing with the developments in North Korea, once again, the main point of 
contention is meaningful sanctions. While the United States, Japan and other 
countries called for sanctions against North Korea, Russia initially denounced the 
idea. Putin said, “We need to move from talk of ultimatums and sanctions 
towards seeing international law prevail in international matters.” (5) 
 
In a blatant step to defy calls for sanctions, Russia delivered food under the guise 
of the United Nations World Food program to the Communist state just two days 
after the nuclear test. Perhaps, anticipating anger from both Japan and the West, 
Yuri Brazhnikov, the head of the international department at the Russian 
Emergency Situations Ministry, defended his country’s aid of 12,800 tons of 
Russian grain to North Korea: “We should ignore the political background 
[around North Korea]. These are targeted food supplies to those who really need 
help.” (6) 
 
Ignoring the political background of North Korea, however, is nearly impossible 
as would be shown through the other point of contention surrounding the nuclear 
test – whether or not North Korea even succeeded in testing its weapon. The day 
after the alleged test, the White House issued a statement claiming that it was 
possible that the seismic action resulting from the test could have been the result 
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of something else and that there was a “possibility that [U.S. scientists] will never 
be able to say to a complete certainty exactly what did occur.” (7) (Subsequently, 
the US concurred that a nuclear test had taken place.) 
 
Russia has stuck with its original claim that North Korea had, indeed, tested a 
nuclear weapon of 5 to 15 kilotons at exactly 5:35 a.m. Moscow time near the 
border of North Korea and Russia’s Primorye Region on October 9. (8). After 
hearing of the White House’s statement, the Kremlin, through Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov, put out a statement of its own: 
 
Our estimates have remained absolutely unchanged…The discrepancy in the 
estimates can be explained by two reasons. The first is purely political ... 
somebody wants it to be more powerful, somebody less [powerful], but I am not 
responsible for that…The second aspect is purely technical. Whose national 
technical devices do you think are closest to the site of the explosion? That is the 
answer to your question. (9) 
 
Clearly, Ivanov made it seem that Russia stands outside any political aspect 
surrounding the issue. However, by alluding to possible political motivations for 
the questioning of the North Korean blast, as well as dismissing any opposing 
views, Ivanov was demonstrating just how important the politics surrounding a 
nuclear-armed Pyongyang are to Moscow. 
 
There exist two major political benefits for Russian foreign policy in making sure 
the world believes that North Korea definitely tested a nuclear bomb, and for the 
first, one need not look much further than just beyond Russia’s borders. 
 
Reason 1: A nuclear-armed North Korea further clouds the international 
community’s vision so that Russia may continue to pursue unjust and often illegal 
(by the standards of international law) policies toward the countries in its Near 
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Abroad, including Georgia, which continues to be the object of Russian bullying. 
North Korea is also a leverage tool. 
 
The last few weeks have seen the continued deterioration of Russian-Georgian 
relations. At the end of September, Georgia arrested five Russian servicemen, 
including four GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) officers, amid accusations of 
espionage. Russia responded by shutting down its embassy in Tbilisi, temporarily 
stopping its scheduled military withdrawal from Georgian bases, and threatening 
military activity (10). Georgia quickly gave in to Russian demands and returned 
the accused officers to Moscow, but Russia did not rescind on its activity. 
Instead, it only intensified the matter by imposing blanket sanctions on Georgia, a 
country that depends on Russian trade and supplies for the majority of its 
livelihood, including most of its energy supply. 
 
Fearing third-party involvement, particularly from the United States, which has 
maintained close ties to Georgia since its Rose Revolution, Putin warned, “I 
would not advise anyone to talk with Russia in the language of provocation and 
blackmail.” (11) 
 
The international community has largely heeded to Putin’s warning. At the time of 
writing, not a single state had stepped up to criticize Russia’s rather unbalanced 
reaction to Georgia’s arresting of the officers. In fact, on October 16, the United 
States adopted a resolution essentially as drafted by Russia. Sergei Markov, the 
director of Russia’s Institute for Political Research, predicted that a deal would be 
brokered between Russia and the United States. He explained that in exchange 
for Russian support for a North Korean resolution, which Russia eventually 
signed on October 16 despite its original opposition, the United States would sign 
a resolution on Georgia that it originally opposed. (12) The difference between 
the resolutions, however, is enormous – the North Korean resolution will likely do 
little to deter North Korea from pursuing its nuclear ambitions, while the Georgian 
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resolution gives Russia unprecedented ability to enforce its will on another 
sovereign state. 
 
Similarly, the European Union also has also flailed in taking a stance on events in 
Georgia. Last week, the EU debated a resolution that was supposed to criticize 
sharply the Kremlin’s actions in Georgia. According to EU sources, this resolution 
comes at the initiative of the Czech Republic, but has been largely pushed 
through by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, who took part in past conflict 
resolution in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. (13) 
 
The EU’s Nordic, Baltic and Central European States backed the original text, 
however, by the time the resolution was to be adapted, it had been toned down. 
At the insistence of France and the United Kingdom, two countries that, like the 
United States, also belong to the UN SC and counted on Russian support for a 
North Korean resolution, the final text targeted both Russia and Georgia. Not 
only did it express "its grave concern at the measures adopted by the Russian 
Federation against Georgia and at their economic, political and humanitarian 
consequences," but it also stated, "The Georgian leadership should avoid any 
action that could heighten the tensions." (14) 
 
Perhaps an unfortunate omen for the resolution's outcome, EU diplomats were 
already making excuses for why they would not pass a stronger resolution 
criticizing Russia. One who spoke to RFE/RL claimed that Georgia will often 
“overplay its hand, making it difficult for its friends to help it.” (15). 
 
Reason 2: A nuclear-armed North Korea takes pressure off of Russia’s 
increasingly controversial dealings with Iran.  
             
It has been no secret that Russia has come under increasing scrutiny in the past 
few months regarding its intentions with Iran. While Russia continues to back 
Iran’s claims that it is pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful energy needs, 
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some analysts have begun to suspect the Kremlin of essentially stalling for time 
while Iran accumulates the know-how to build a nuclear weapon. Adding to this 
controversy was a contentious weapons deal last February, in which Moscow 
sold to Iran $700 million worth of anti-air missiles that have the capability to 
defend a nuclear arsenal. (16) 
 
Today, the situation, as far as resolving the policy differences between the United 
States and Russia regarding Iran, is at a complete standstill. As of October 11, 
agreements about sanctions could still not be reached and the matter would be 
turned over to the UN Security Council (17), where Russia has threatened to use 
its veto power numerous times if the UNSC were to propose sanctions.  
 
With the United States already preoccupied with the growing strife in Iraq, Russia 
has been able to maintain its position regarding Iran with little consequence. 
Now, with the trouble in North Korea, Russia has increased its political leverage 
regarding Iran while Pyongyang demands immediate attention from Washington. 
While Russia may be willing to soften its stance on North Korea in exchange for 
the West’s softer stance on Georgia, it will not do the same regarding Iran. 
Markov notes, “Iran is somewhat different.” (18) He is right. The big difference 
pertains to Russia’s direct involvement with each country. Unlike its policy with 
Iran, where Russia has significant economic interests including lucrative arms 
deals and business pertaining to nuclear technology, Russia’s economic ties to 
North Korea totaled only $115 million in 2002 (19) – a fraction of its investment 
with Iran. 
 
There is a third reason, which may explain best why Russia benefits from North 
Korea becoming a nuclear power – it boosts Russia’s image as a resurging 
superpower in the world by making Russia the spoiler. The international 
community needs Russia to agree with a resolution. It makes one wonder, 
however, whether the Kremlin cares at all about the long-term. Is getting the 
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international spotlight in the short-term really as important as deterring North 
Korea, a country that shares its border, from developing a large nuclear arsenal? 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
GEORGIA 
For “Georgian” read “criminal” 
Russian law enforcement has shown an extraordinary surge in efficiency in the 
month of October. Tax evasion, sanitary violations and illegal immigration no 
longer are being tolerated in the Russian capital, and the wave of crackdowns 
has begun to reach further into outlying regions as well. These measures, far 
from being a laudable move to strengthen civil order, constitute, in fact, a sinister 
signal of encroaching extremist nationalism and anti-Georgian sentiment 
expressed at the highest levels. As tensions between Russia and its Caucasian 
neighbor escalate following the arrest of four Russian intelligence officers in 
Tbilisi last month (and their immediate release by Georgia), authorities in 
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Moscow are doing their part to bring the war home by making daily life intolerable 
for Georgians living in the Russian capital. 
 
The key to overcoming the gross ineptitude and complaisance that long 
hampered law enforcement efforts in the country has turned on a simple, 
chauvinistic tactic of tracking down ethnic Georgians living in Russia. Current 
criminal investigations appear to be following the retrograde rationale of ethnic 
profiling, wherein ethnic Georgians, (including school children), are first identified, 
then vetted for legal violations. By criminalizing Georgian residents, Moscow 
authorities have found a convenient expedient for cleaning up crime in the city, 
so the logic goes. 
 
From friend to public enemy  
From a historical perspective, the decision to criminalize Georgians constitutes a 
strange and unprecedented move. The two nations have been close allies since 
the rise of Muscovy during the sixteenth century, when, in 1586, an Orthodox 
Georgian Kingdom, beset by Muslims, asked to be accepted as a vassal state by 
the Russian tsar. Georgia became part of the Tsarist Empire early in the 19th 
century. The two nations share a common Orthodox faith and a history of 
economic and cultural partnership. At a recent Kremlin gala, Marlen Khutsiyev, a 
film director, said “I have two homelands—Georgia and Russia. My heart belongs 
to them both. I am confident that all this will pass and common sense will prevail. 
Our relations bound by many years of history, a common faith and a huge 
interconnection between our cultures can never be broken.”(1)  That camaraderie 
has dissolved as Russia has impinged on Georgian sovereignty and encouraged 
separatist leaders, as Georgia moves toward Europe and as Georgian residents 
in Moscow find their daily movements hampered by authorities. 
 
Criminals among us  
Russia is host to an estimated one million Georgians, or one fifth of the 
Caucasus country’s population, and a deputy speaker of the Duma suggested 
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that at least 300,000 are residing in the country illegally. (2)  Their legal standing 
is likely to become ever more unsure as Putin has urged the government to 
toughen visa regulation and introduce quotas on the foreign labor force by 
November 15. His statements were made to the National Priority Projects 
Council, where he said, “I instruct the government to make immediate decisions 
regulating trade at retail and wholesale markets.”(3)  While his orders ostensibly 
were aimed at bolstering Russian agriculture and employment opportunities for 
Russian citizens, his message to the foreigners from the Caucasus who 
dominate Moscow’s food and retail markets was clear. A foreigner’s country of 
origin will be one of the leading criteria for receiving a work and residence permit 
according to the new system of quotas, drawing domestic policy into the arena of 
Russian international goals. The ability to work legally in Russia itself may 
become a moot issue, following the State Duma’s decision to suspend money 
transfers between Russia and Georgia, leaving foreign workers unable to send 
their earnings home. 
 
Laundry list of infractions 
Under the guise of a public morality campaign, Moscow police has shut down five 
of the city’s major casinos which are said to be controlled by the Georgian mafia. 
Tax code violations were cited as the reason for the inspections by Anzhela 
Kastoyeva, a spokesperson for the Interior Ministry. While the gambling industry 
has well-documented ties to organized crime, casinos are not the only targets of 
the Interior Ministry’s crackdown. Popular Georgian restaurants have closed their 
doors following armed raids by tax police and health inspectors, and markets in 
the city’s outskirts have been locked up for “sanitary treatment.”(4)  Such 
vigilance on the part of tax police and health inspectors is a rare phenomenon in 
Russia and in itself is grounds for suspicion, which the following statement by the 
Moscow police only serves to confirm: “I cannot say that we are deliberately 
checking facilities belonging to Georgian citizens, but most of the establishments 
that will be checked tomorrow do have Georgian owners.”(5) 
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Nor are high profile Georgian figures exempt from official scrutiny. “I never 
thought that in Russia I’d live to see the day there was ethnic cleansing in the 
country,” said one of Russia’s most popular novelists, Georgian-born Grigory 
Chkhartishvili, who writes under the pen name Boris Akunin. He has been the 
subject of a tax probe together with the Georgian-born president of the Russian 
Academy of Arts, sculptor Zurab Tserteli. (6) 
 
In an atmosphere fraught with racial tension, auto accidents are turning into 
public relations nightmares for Georgian authorities, who are being called upon to 
answer for negligent Georgian drivers. On 5 October, a Zhiguli crashed into a car 
belonging to the presidential envoy to the State Duma. The police report stressed 
that the driver’s name was Khiladze and that he was born in Tbilisi. (7)  A 
second, absurdly inopportune collision, dominated the theme of a radio interview 
with Georgian ambassador Irakly Chubinishvili, who was asked to comment on 
the allegation that an embassy employee hit an ambulance while driving drunk in 
central Moscow. His response, “I believe that under normal conditions this road 
accident would not have been discussed so widely,” was followed by a scolding 
from the Ekho Moskvy anchor who said, “when that escalation started in 
Russian-Georgian relations so much discussed today, have not any special 
instructions been issued that your employees should be more cautious, should 
try to avoid any slightest incidents?” (8) 
 
No provocation was needed, however, for authorities to strike a blow at the 
Georgian embassy itself. A Georgian government guesthouse located behind its 
Moscow embassy was seized by Interior Ministry policemen, who pried the 
nameplate off the door, claiming that the building had been occupied illegally. 
The rightful owner found himself in possession of the building only last summer, 
and said that he had been notified of the property transfer only a few days 
before. (9) 
 
Vetting the streets 
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As of October 12, 480 Georgians already have been deported for document 
infringements, according to the Moscow Bureau of Human Rights. (10)  Ordinary 
Georgian citizens residing in Russia are finding their daily routines hampered by 
regular document checks on the streets both in Moscow and beyond, as ethnic 
profiling has taken on unconscionable proportions.  The Moscow Times reported 
that in St. Petersburg, a senior city police official instructed officers to redouble 
their efforts to deport illegal migrants, and in the city of Kaluga, police have 
received orders to run checks on citizens with names ending in “idze” and 
“shvili.”(11)  The Guardian quoted a priest at St. George Cathedral in central 
Moscow as saying that worshippers had been detained at a weekend service; “it 
interfered with a funeral service and was very humiliating.”(12) 
 
A government that has shown itself so insensitive historically as to evoke the 
grim figures of Beria and Stalin in order to whip up ethnic tensions currently is 
resorting to dubious measures that echo the acts of the twentieth century’s 
fascist regimes. The hunt for ethnic Georgians has taken police officials into 
grade schools. Regional police departments sent telegrams to Moscow schools, 
asking them to provide lists of pupils with Georgian last names. Because all 
children are entitled to education regardless of registration, authorities have 
found that the easiest way to find Georgians is through their children. 
Kommersant reported that the initiative came directly from the Internal Affairs 
Ministry. Their source reported that “police officers were supposed to come to 
schools and talk to principals. However, minor police departments flaked out and 
only sent telegrams to schools, due to which the story became public.” (13) 
 
Let no one say that the Russian authorities are inefficient when faced with a 
national project. Chauvinism is proving to be a remarkably potent motivation.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Excerpt from report by Russian Centre TV, 6 Oct 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(2) RIA Novosti, 6 Oct 06, “Russia deports Georgians as casino crackdown 
continues” via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Financial Times, 12 Oct 06, “Action against Georgian interests takes on 
nationalistic tone” via www.ft.com. 
(5) The Guardian (London), 5 Oct 06, “Kremlin targets Georgians after spy row” 
via Lexis Nexis. 
(6) As reported in Moscow Times, 12 Oct 06, “Georgians Watch Their Future 
Vanish in Court” via www.themoscowtimes.com. 
(7) BBC Excerpt from report by Russian Centre TV on 6 Oct 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Ekho Moskvy, Radio Interview with Georgian Ambassador Irakly 
Chubinishvili, 10 Oct 06, 4:35 PM via www.echo.msk.ru. 
(9) Financial, 12 Oct 06, “Action against Georgian interests takes on nationalistic 
tone” via www.ft.com. 
(10) Moscow Bureau for Human Rights web site via www.antirasizm.ru/english. 
(11) As reported in Moscow Times, 12 Oct 06, “Georgians Watch Their Future 
Vanish in Court” via www.themoscowtimes.com. 
(12) The Guardian (London), 12 Oct 06, “Georgians in Moscow live in fear after 
crackdown, says envoy” via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Kommersant, 6 Oct 06, “The war has a child’s face” via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
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TAJIKISTAN 
Going through the motions: Presidential elections in Tajikistan 
In just a few weeks, Tajikistan will hold its third presidential election since 
becoming an independent republic in 1991.  President Emomali Rahmonov once 
again will run as the candidate for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and it 
 37 
seems almost certain that he will win, extending his rule until at least 2013, when 
he will have the option of standing for re-election one last time, according to the 
terms of Tajikistan’s current constitution. (1)  As a fourteen-year incumbent with 
virtually unlimited access to the media, there is little doubt that President 
Rahmonov will win another term, whether or not the election is conducted in a 
free and open manner. 
 
None of the four other parties (the Communist Party, the Party of Economic 
Reforms, the Agrarian Party, and the Socialist Party) which are fielding 
candidates in the election, (2) poses a serious threat to President Rahmonov.  
Those opposition parties which could have presented at least a minor challenge 
to the president have chosen not to participate in these elections.  The four 
parties that have decided to sit out the elections are:  the main branch of the 
Democratic Party of Tajikistan (the DPT, chaired by Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, 
who is serving a prison sentence), one branch of the Socialist Party (chaired by 
Mirhusein Nazriev), the Social Democratic Party (chaired by Rahmatullo Zoirov) 
and the Islamic Renaissance party of Tajikistan (the IRPT, chaired by Muhiddin 
Kabiri).  The DPT, Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party have decided to 
boycott the elections altogether, due to their conviction that the upcoming vote 
will be neither fair nor democratic, because of shortcomings in Tajikistan’s 
electoral laws.  The IRPT – chaired by Muhiddin Kabiri), which is arguably the 
strongest member of the opposition and perhaps the only party which could 
present a serious challenge to Rahmonov’s candidacy, has decided not to 
nominate a candidate, but will send observers to monitor voting procedures (3) 
and is encouraging its members to exercise their right to vote. (4) 
 
Surprisingly, although the IRPT is also concerned about the insufficiencies in the 
country’s election laws, (5) Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri announced that his party’s 
primary reason for not fielding its own presidential candidate is the international 
community’s concern about Islamic activism in Tajikistan.  Mr. Kabiri told the 
press that “an important element in our decision” is “the unsuitability of the 
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international situation and the reservations about Islamic political forces. There is 
also a lack of mutual trust between us and the international community. We didn't 
want to put Tajikistan in an awkward position. In other words, we didn't want to 
place our country and our party at the front line of criticism that Islamic 
movements are very active here. We have once again sacrificed our rights so as 
not to block possible aid to Tajikistan.” (6) 
 
The opposition’s concerns that the upcoming elections will be rife with procedural 
irregularities and outright violations of electoral law are certainly legitimate – thus 
far, none of the presidential or parliamentary elections which have taken place in 
post-Soviet Tajikistan have been completely free or fair.  In addition to ballot box-
stuffing and measures taken to keep voters in certain districts away from the 
polls, Central Election Commission (CEC) officials also have been very 
successful at keeping popular opposition candidates off the ballots altogether, by 
refusing to register their parties.  It is therefore not surprising that many 
opposition leaders have become so frustrated with the election system that they 
would rather not participate in it at all.  However, it is unlikely that a three-party 
boycott of the 2006 presidential elections will bring about any change in the 
CEC’s conduct, much less in the election laws.  The CEC has successfully 
managed to keep opposition representatives out of its ranks and Tajikistan’s 
current parliament is overwhelmingly pro-Rahmonov and therefore can not be 
expected to undertake any legislation that is not in the President’s favor.  Given 
the current political situation, the opposition’s best hope for bringing about 
change in Tajikistan’s electoral system might be to make a point of participating 
in each election, in order to continue testing the system, while simultaneously 
lobbying to reform it.  Opposition party leaders need to maintain pressure on the 
CEC at both the national and local levels to diversify its membership, as well as 
carefully monitoring pre-election procedures and the polling process itself and 
then presenting a list of violations to both the president and the legislature, as 
further evidence that the election laws need to be reformed. 
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Such efforts would require a united opposition movement, whose leaders were 
able to set aside their personal ambitions and petty quarrels, in order to work 
together.  Unfortunately, Tajikistan’s opposition increasingly has become divided 
since the civil war ended; in fact, two of the parties which are boycotting the 
elections (the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party) have splintered into 
competing factions. (7)  The Democratic Party’s splinter group, which calls itself 
Vatan (Fatherland), suddenly received official recognition from the Justice 
Ministry in late September (8) and attempted to register a candidate in the 
presidential race, but was unable to gather enough signatures. (9)  Both wings of 
the Socialist Party nominated presidential candidates, but only the faction 
headed by Abduhalim Ghafforov was granted official recognition by the Justice 
Ministry, thereby keeping the second faction’s candidate (Mirhusein Nazriev) off 
the ballot. (10)   These internal divisions, which no doubt were further 
exacerbated by the Justice Ministry’s clear attempt to play one group off against 
the other, no doubt also provided a strong incentive for Democratic and Socialist 
Party supporters to boycott the elections. 
 
The IRPT is not suffering from internal divisions, but from the death of its long-
time leader and former head of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Said Abdullo 
Nuri, who died of cancer in August of this year.  Mr. Nuri was elected chairman of 
the IRPT on 18 September 1999 (11) and prior to that served first as the leader 
of the Tajik opposition during the civil war (1992-1997) and then as leader of the 
National Reconciliation Commission during the peace process.  Mr. Nuri’s death 
was a serious blow to the IRPT leadership, especially occurring so soon before 
the presidential elections and has left the party little time to regroup and unite 
behind its new chairman, Muhiddin Kabiri.  Due to his long involvement with the 
Tajik opposition and the significant role he played in ending the civil war, Mr. Nuri 
was a well-known figure, who, over the years, had received considerable media 
coverage.  Mr. Kabiri has had little time to introduce himself to his own 
constituency, much less to the rest of Tajikistan’s voters.  At age forty, he is a 
relatively young man, whose education and experience have been largely 
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secular – he received a university degree in Oriental Studies and has not had the 
religious training for which his predecessor was known and widely revered. (12)  
His lack of religious training may prove to be a significant hindrance, if he is 
unable to persuade the more devout elements of the IRPT’s constituency of his 
competence to interpret and rule on Muslim spiritual matters.  On the other hand, 
the fact that he has had a mainly secular education may appeal to the less 
religious members of the party, as well as to the rest of Tajikistan’s voters.  If he 
were to run in the upcoming presidential election, it might help him gauge the 
scope of his support among the population. 
 
One can only hope that by the time of the next presidential election in 2013, the 
opposition parties will have managed to overcome their internal divisions and will 
participate in the election to the fullest extent, in order to provide Tajikistan’s 
voters with a genuine and varied choice of candidates.  It is also to be hoped that 
by 2013, the opposition and the government will have succeeded in creating an 
electoral system that allows for real competition among both presidential and 
parliamentary candidates. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Gulnora Amirshoeva, Saodat Asanova,, and Madina Saifiddinova, “Tajiks’ 
Election Choices Already Limited,” IWPR (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) 
RCA No. 467, 5 Oct 06 via www.iwpr.net. 
(2) “Tajik Poll Body Unveils Five Ultimate Presidential Candidates,” ITAR-TASS 
via BBC Monitoring, 8 Oct 06 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(3) “Tajiks’ Election Choices Already Limited,” IWPR RCA No. 467, 5 Oct 06 via 
www.iwpr.net. 
(4) “Tajik Islamic opposition party leader says quit election race for sake of 
peace,” Avesta website via BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 26 Sep 06 via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
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(5) “Tajik Islamic opposition party leader says quit election race for sake of 
peace,” Avesta website via BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 26 Sep 06 via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 
(6) “Main Tajik Opposition Party To Boycott Election,” The Times of Central Asia, 
26 Sep 06 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(7) “Tajiks’ Election Choices Already Limited,” IWPR RCA No. 467, 5 Oct 06 via 
www.iwpr.net. 
(8) “Tajik Opposition Splinter Group Allowed to Take Part in Presidential Poll,” 
Avesta website via BBC Monitoring International Reports, 30 Sep 06 via Lexis-
Nexis Academic Universe. 
(9) “Tajik electoral commission registers two more presidential hopefuls,” Asia-
Plus via BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 11 Oct 06 via Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Universe. 
(10) “Tajik socialist party barred from presidential poll,” Asia-Plus via BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 22 Sep 06 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
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UKRAINE 
To be or not to be … an opposition 
On Tuesday, the pro-presidential political bloc Our Ukraine (OU) registered as an 
opposition party in Ukraine’s parliament. (1)  President Viktor Yushchenko’s bloc 
officially pulled out of previous agreements with Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovich’s ruling Party of Regions and suggested that its ministers would be 
withdrawn from the cabinet. 
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If this occurs, it would leave President Yushchenko with little real representation 
in the cabinet, where all domestic (and some foreign) policy is controlled.  It could 
also add to the strength of the current parliamentary opposition, led by former 
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.  The “opposition” is still an evolving concept in 
Ukraine, but already plays a crucial role in a country still grappling with questions 
of government accountability and rule of law.   
 
Given Our Ukraine’s history of vacillation between political partners and political 
positions, however, the eventual outcome of this latest twist is difficult to predict.  
At a minimum, Our Ukraine’s switch to opposition means that the bloc, at least 
temporarily, has halted lengthy, laborious negotiations with Party of Regions 
representatives over a legal coalition agreement.    Beyond this, however, much 
remains to be seen.  
 
Our Ukraine and the majority of its membership historically have rejected 
opposition-oriented alliances, preferring instead to be as near to “the power” as 
possible.  Indeed, the bloc’s halting of negotiations this month seems to have had 
more to do with the inability of its leadership to secure satisfactory levels of 
power-sharing than disagreements over policy.    
 
Despite recent assertions by Our Ukraine that Yanukovich’s policies have led to 
the “demolition of Ukraine’s internal and external course,” (2) the Prime Minister’s 
policies have not shifted significantly since President Yushchenko and Our 
Ukraine signed a “Declaration of National Unity” with him on 2 August as a 
condition of his nomination as prime minister.  This agreement listed Ukraine’s 
domestic and foreign policy objectives and was hailed by Yushchenko both as a 
starting point for coalition negotiations between OU and Regions, and as a 
guarantee that Yanukovich would follow the president’s policy objectives.  
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In reality, the document was vague, lacked enforcement mechanisms and 
provided Yanukovich with significant room to maneuver within (or slightly outside 
of) the agreement’s stipulations.  He has done so skillfully, while simultaneously 
spurning suggestions from Our Ukraine that the bloc is needed within the 
governing coalition.  The ruling coalition unites Regions with the Socialists and 
the Communists, providing a majority of about 242 out of 450 without Our 
Ukraine.   Despite some tension among the participants, the coalition agreement 
has held well since its creation.   This has allowed Yanukovich to challenge the 
president’s authority – exploiting constitutional inconsistencies over spheres of 
control.  
 
On 17 October, OU leader Roman Bezsmertny suggested that, under the 
Yanukovich government, "Ukraine's process of integration into the WTO is being 
wrecked, the program of Ukraine's accession to the EU has been basically 
stopped and there has been a fundamental block on Ukraine's entry into NATO.”  
(3)  It is true that Yanukovich and his coalition have halted preparations for NATO 
entry, slowed preparation for the WTO and paid little attention to EU reforms.  
But, given Yanukovich’s previous anti-NATO rhetoric and his consistent caution 
towards the WTO and the EU, this should be of little surprise.    
 
In fact, the “Declaration of National Unity” provides no timetable for NATO and 
EU preparation – Yanukovich refused to sign it if it did.  And, although the 
document states that the Yanukovich government and parliamentary majority will 
enact reforms “necessary for entering the World Trade Organization by the end 
of 2006,” the coalition partner Communist Party always refused to endorse this 
particular article of the agreement, immediately calling it into question.  (4) 
 
Therefore, Our Ukraine could not, or should not, have expected any behavior 
other than that which is being exhibited currently by the Yanukovich government.  
Upon signing the “Declaration,” perhaps they had hoped to be able to influence 
Yanukovich more heavily, or perhaps they had expected to be given greater 
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control over government and parliamentary activities.  Neither of these things 
happened. 
 
Nevertheless, some members of Our Ukraine remain hesitant to make the 
transition to the opposition. 
 
Cabinet ministers nominated on the personal quota of President Yushchenko – 
who remains the honorary leader of Our Ukraine – have expressed reluctance to 
resign.  A spokesman for Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk suggested, "A 
decision on his resignation is for the president to make.” (5)  Tarasyuk is the 
leader of one of the largest parties in the Our Ukraine bloc – a party whose ruling 
council supported the call for all Our Ukraine ministers to leave the cabinet and 
join the opposition.  Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, Defense Minister Anatoliy 
Hrytsenko and Justice Minister Roman Zvarych also have so far rejected the call 
to resign, while most Our Ukraine-nominated ministers have remained silent.  
 
President Yushchenko himself initially objected to the idea of his party going into 
opposition, despite Yanukovich’s attempts to assert his control over what have 
historically been presidential matters.  On 11 October, Yushchenko urged a 
resumption of negotiations between Our Ukraine and the Party of Regions.  “I 
feel most of the participants of the talks think the negotiations are incomplete and 
that there is still some chance to compromise,” he said. (6) 
 
In a clear rebuke – the first of its kind from his party – this idea was immediately 
rejected by Our Ukraine.  But at the same time, Bezsmertny provided confusing 
answers regarding the type of opposition Our Ukraine will mount.  His most 
concrete suggestion has been that his bloc will not work closely with the bloc of 
former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, which declared its “radical opposition” 
status on 3 August, immediately after Yanukovich’s nomination.  Tymoshenko is 
widely viewed as the country’s primary opposition leader, and attempted last 
month to form an inter-party opposition.  Our Ukraine quickly rejected that idea.  
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“Our Ukraine does not conduct any negotiations,” Bezsmertny said. “If Yuliya 
Volodymyrivna [Tymoshenko] makes relevant proposals, we are ready to renew 
a dialogue,” he added.  (7) But they will not approach her, he underscored, while 
suggesting that there should be only one opposition bloc. 
 
The remark is reminiscent of Bezsmertny’s comments in 2002 in advance of the 
second round of the so-called “Rise Up! Ukraine” protests against then-President 
Leonid Kuchma.  Tymoshenko, the Socialists and the Communists had been 
leading protests for months, while Our Ukraine’s leadership had declined to 
endorse the original protests.  Then, in a change of course at the end of 2002, 
Bezsmertny suggested that Our Ukraine “should be the leader of the protests 
rather than follow Tymoshenko or anyone else.” (8)  This thought process seems 
still to be prevalent in Our Ukraine in 2006. 
 
To underscore their point, this week, Our Ukraine hosted a meeting of potential 
opposition partners to create what it calls a “constructive opposition.”  Nine 
parties or blocs were invited to the meeting.  The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko – 
already in opposition – was not.  The omission underscores the animosity 
between Tymoshenko and certain members of Our Ukraine; the former prime 
minister earlier accused several leaders of the bloc of improperly profiting from 
their government connections.  They denied these charges. 
 
The omission also underscores the difficulty Ukrainian politicians will have in 
pursuing a unified program.  In recent days, votes in the parliament have shown 
serious division between Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine, with both blocs 
sometimes voting with the majority, but rarely with each other.  This could have 
serious, negative consequences for the country’s course to Europe, which is 
already endangered, and for President Yushchenko’s agenda.  
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Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine’s various leaders have all 
denounced the 2007 budget proposal from Yanukovich’s government, suggesting 
is backtracks on previous reforms.  The document is said not to use accepted 
IMF macro-economic standards for evaluating revenues and expenditures.  It 
reportedly cuts funds from social programs championed by Yushchenko, alters 
the tax system to provide significant breaks for large businesses that may be 
associated with government ministers, and funds regional budgets based on an 
arbitrary system that gives regions supporting Yanukovich a much bigger piece 
of the pie.  Yushchenko has already stated that he will not sign it if passed as is – 
setting up the first real power struggle between the two men. 
 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine likely will need the help of Tymoshenko to alter the 
budget on behalf of the president.  Bezsmertny’s party holds 79 seats, while 
Tymoshenko controls 122.  The apparent attempt to marginalize Tymoshenko 
could lead to the failure of Our Ukraine’s legislative proposals. 
 
This is, of course, if Our Ukraine chooses to remain in the opposition.  On 18 
October, Our Ukraine’s Minister for Sport, Family and Youth Yuriy Pavlenko, 
suggested that his party may return to the bargaining table with Yanukovich. (9)  
At the same time, though, Pavlenko suggested that he is prepared to resign, 
while Yushchenko urged Our Ukraine’s ministers to implement the will of their 
party.  (10) 
 
Source Notes:  
 
(1) “Our Ukraine officially joins opposition (Part 2),” Interfax, 0854 GMT, 17 Oct 
06 via (www.interfax.com) 
(2) Agence France Presse, 1309 GMT, 17 Oct 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Ibid. 
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